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A B S T R A C T
Rare earths elements (REE) are considered as strategic resources because they interact with business and gov-
ernments’ direct policy interventions. Policy interventions can have a major eﬀect on security of rare earth
supply (Kooroshy et al., 2015). The purpose of this study is to scrutinize China’s REE policies and its impacts on
the supply chain resilience. We analyze the supply chain dynamics by speciﬁcally targeting a number of Chinese
REE policies that have disruptive tendencies. We analyze various policies placing the price at the center as an
overarching feedback loop. In other words, we focus on how price responds to various resilience inﬂuencing
mechanisms such as diversity of supply, regulatory frameworks, and stockpiling. In the process, we investigate
Chinese inﬂuence on rest of the world (RoW) supply chain and dynamics inside the Chinese supply chain as there
are two diﬀerent layers of supply chain one for China and another one for rest of the world. We show that the
supply chain is a complex phenomenon and resilience of a system is not solely dependent on physical disruptions
but also on dynamic factors such as societal and geo-political (eg. environmental regulation, speculative market
and export ban). We identify links and interdependencies even where data is not readily available and examine
how the overall system reacts to various constraints and disruptions.
1. Introduction
Disruptions can have a major eﬀect on security of supply. This is
especially true for critical materials. There are many examples of dis-
ruptions–ranging from ﬂoods to trade disputes to civil wars–and in the
past decades severe supply chain disruptions aﬀected a signiﬁcant
number of materials.
Conceptually, disruptions can happen either slow or fast, and on the
supply or demand side. This classiﬁcation gives four types, as seen in
Table 1.
The most prominent method of determining and analyzing material
criticality, Graedel et al. (2012), primarily takes disruptions into ac-
count through mining investment risk indicators which are in turn
based on political stability of the host country through the ratio of
foreign and domestic supply. This ratio is used to determine the vul-
nerability to supply disruptions.
An alternative viewpoint to supply chain disruptions is that of trade
ﬂows. Trade and trade disruptions can be analyzed in physical terms.
For example, Gholz and Daryl, (2010) discussed the possibility of a
disruption to global oil trade if Iran would use anti-ship missiles to
block the Strait of Hormuz. Olson (2015) speculates that only an in-
terruption of service at a major port would be able to signiﬁcantly
disrupt global trade in aluminum. Mancheri et al. (2018) found that in
case of tantalum, physical disruptions did not aﬀect the supply chain
seriously as the industry’s ability to respond is well characterized by
resilience-promoting mechanisms such as diversity of supply, stock-
piling, and substitution.
In an attempt to predict which supply chains will be disrupted be-
yond identifying which materials are critical, resilience is a useful way
of thinking about how to deal with inevitable disruptions of all types,
especially those of the unexpected kind. To do so, we investigate a
number rare earth policies that China introduced in post 2010 crisis and
evaluate how these policies aﬀect the REE supply chain, and prices. By
applying the resilience framework, we try to generate a wider under-
standing of legislative and environmental risk and its impact on the
global REE supply chain.
We argue that politics – and speciﬁcally industrial and trade policies
– have a much larger inﬂuence on trade ﬂows than physical disruptions.
In this paper we aim to address the disruptions in the rare earth supply
chain from the perspective of trade ﬂows and policy. We focus on the
eﬀect of policy on the rare earth supply chain and use this analysis to
update the critical materials resilience framework with a number of
trade and policy related parameters.
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1.1. Rare earths
Rare earths are used in numerous products such as battery alloys,
polishing powders, liquid crystal displays (LCDs), hybrid cars, and light
emitting diodes (LEDs). They also have a strategic role in such military
applications as guidance and control, targeting and weapon systems,
and communication platforms (US. Department of Energy, 2011). China
is the world’s largest producer, consumer and exporter of rare earths,
controlling more than 90 percent of the global supply base with a vir-
tual monopoly. Currently, Chinese REE extraction expertise remains
unparalleled, the necessary production capacities, infrastructure and
distribution channels all exist with a fairly lax environment, including
work place safety regulations and low labor costs.
The two major drivers of demand for REEs are the rate of overall
economic growth and the new development in material applications.
For example, sustainable technologies which include REE have grown
dramatically in the last two decades. The most rapid growth has been in
demand for new applications including magnets, phosphors, catalysts
and batteries, which now account for over 60 percent of the demand,
and will continue to grow, fueled by heavy investments in clean energy.
Table 2 shows typical quantities of REEs used in the diﬀerent in-
termediate products. Each intermediate product uses only some of the
17 REEs. Lanthanum and cerium for example are the two REEs used in
the catalysts for petroleum reﬁning. In contrast, permanent magnets use
Praseodymium, Neodymium, Gadolinium, Dysprosium and Terbium.
Magnets dominate REE usage by weight and value. Catalysts claim the
second-highest usage, and metal alloys account for the third highest
(Kingsnorth, 2018).
China controls the global REE industry and has established a
dominant position in the entire value chain. This control extends all the
way from mining to the production of key intermediate products such
as magnets. Many of these intermediate products are critical inputs for
high growth industries. These are also the industries in which China is
trying to build scale with the aim of dominating the supply chain
(Mancheri et al., 2013).
In 2010 and 2011 when the Chinese export restrictions became
more apparent, many of the world’s experts predicted a supply deﬁcit of
rare earth oxides (REO) in future, as demand expected to exceed the
industry’s ability to produce. However that situation has changed since
2013. China’s increased production quota and removal of export quotas
along with new or reopened mines outside China are expected to in-
crease global production, resulting in an overall surplus, shortfalls are
expected in certain elements, particularly in neodymium and europium,
and the heavy rare earths such as terbium and dysprosium. Demand for
rare-earths is likely to increase between 7–8% annually (Kingsnorth,
2016).
China was a small producer and an exporter of low value REE
concentrates prior to 1990s. From 2000 onwards China became the
world’s leading producer and exporter, and quickly achieved near-
monopoly control over the REE supply chain. China was able to acquire
their position from 2000 to 2015 via operational cost competitiveness.
During this period, China has introduced several policies related to
REEs that have had profound eﬀects on rare earth supply chain glob-
ally. China’s introduction of these policies were targeted to the overall
development of the REE industry, domestic industrial needs, curtailing
over exploitation and illegal mining. In addition, the government also
targets domestic companies to add value by making technologically
advanced products rather than exporting the raw material. While China
restricted the export of minerals, there were no speciﬁc restrictions on
exports of ﬁnished products. The major REE policies that China im-
plemented since 2015 in achieving the above mentioned targets are
depicted in the Fig. 1.
An overview of REE industry in China including the performance,
problems the industry faces and the targeted policy objectives were
described in a document released by the China Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology in October 2016 (MIIT, 2016). The document
advocates more state intervention to tackle internal problems such as
illegal rare earth production, illegal transaction and processing, lack of
innovation, overcapacity problems in upstream sectors and poor legal
and regulatory systems to address environmental pollution. The REE
development objectives of the government is summarized in the
Table 3.
The proposed policy targets explained in Table 3 will inﬂuence the
REE supply chain resilience in diﬀerent ways. Our analysis in the results
are directly linked to the observed indicators in Table 3. Having ob-
served the eﬃcacy of a resilience framework in analyzing supply chain
disruptions, we extend the resilience model to include the Chinese REE
policies (Sprecher et al., 2015).
1.2. Literature review on REEs and policy
As an important strategic mineral resource, REE has been a hot topic
for research in recent years. When focusing on REE resource or in-
dustry, some scholars holistically observed its reserve, production,
consumption and international trade (Feng, 2007; Tse, 2011; Mancheri,
2012; Massari and Ruberti, 2013; Nieto and Zhang, 2013; Mancheri,
2015; Nguyen and Imholte, 2016; Wang et al., 2016) or only focused on
one kind of rare earth, such as ion-adsorption rare earth (Yang et al.,
2013) or single elements (Zhang et al., 2017) and applications (Kulekci,
2009; Goonan, 2012; Sprecher and Kleijn, 2014, 2017). The uneven
distribution and diﬃculty to substitute rare earths led to studies on its
supply security and trends. Zhang et al. (2017) exclusively dealt with
supply security and criticality of Yittrium and found that Yttrium pro-
duction causes a variety of environmental/sustainability issues, making
the supply vulnerable to more stringent environmental politics. Han
(2015), Mancheri et al. (2013) and Wübbeke (2015) discussed China’s
rare earth policy and proposed some policy implications, such as
boosting innovation capability and establishment of a strategic resource
reserve system. Nevertheless, even though China’s rare earth supply has
declined, some studies indicated that there is little signiﬁcant shortage
of rare earth supply for the rest of world (Golev et al., 2014; Tukker,
2014; Rollat et al., 2016) because some countermeasures have been
adopted by foreign countries (Mancheri and Marukawa, 2016; Sprecher
et al., 2015; Dobransky, 2013; Barteková and Kemp, 2016). More ex-
perts turned to consider the recycle and waste management of REE
because they are new potentially major sources for supply (Bailey et al.,
2017; Schulze and Buchert, 2016 and Binnemans et al., 2013; Morf
et al., 2013; Rademaker et al., 2013; Habib and Wenzel, 2014;
Table 1
Types of system disturbances (Sprecher et al., 2015).
Supply Demand
Fast Natural disaster, trade embargo Disruptive demand change
Slow Protective trade measures, ore
depletion
Societal or technological trends
Table 2
Estimated Global Rare Earths Demand (by application in 2017).
Source: Based on Table 3, Kingsnorth (2018).
Application Total (in tons) Market share (%)
Catalysts 30,000 18
Glass 9,500 6
Polishing 22,000 14
Metal Alloys 31,000 18
Magnets 51,000 30
Phosphors
(including pigments)
5000 3
Ceramics 8500 5
Other 10,500 6
Total 167,500 100
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Machacek et al., 2015). Moreover, the recycling and waste management
of REE can also contribute to minimizing the negative environmental
impacts caused by rare earth production (Wan and Wen, 2015). In
addition, there have been studies on replacement of REE as input and its
eﬀects on clean energy development (Alonso et al., 2012; Kleijn, 2012;
Riddle et al., 2015; Stegen, 2015).
As the largest producer and exporter of rare earths, China’s rare
earth policies, especially the export restrictions have been of con-
siderable interest in recent years. Several studies demonstrated that the
motivations of China’s rare earth policy were the domestic concerns,
such as environmental protection and resources conservation (Gu,
2011; Hayes-Labruto et al., 2013; Wübbeke, 2013; Barteková and
Kemp, 2016), the development of competitive downstream industries
(Wübbeke, 2015), and the relocation of rare earth intensive industries
(Pothen and Fink, 2015). However, some studies found that the re-
strictions did not fulﬁll the objective of environmental protection
(Korinek and Kim, 2010; Gavin, 2013; Mancheri, 2015) and violated
international trade law (Hu, 2012; WTO, 2014). Rare earths are
cheaper to make in China because of less strict environmental stan-
dards. Perhaps, the western countries could pay a subsidy to compen-
sate the environmental pollution but this again would violate trade law.
This presents an even greater challenge because it is diﬃcult to quantify
the cost diﬀerences due to diﬀerent environmental regulations (U.S.
Oﬃce of Technology Assessment, 1992)
China’s rare earth policies have impacted both domestic and foreign
rare earth industry. Lackner and McEwen-Fial (2011) and Zhang et al.
(2015) indicated that China’s rare earth policies exerted signiﬁcant
eﬀects on the market power and price sensitivity of China’s rare earth in
the international market. Especially, the export restrictions would raise
the world price, threat the stable supply (Zachmann, 2010; Wübbeke,
2015; Mancheri, 2015), and hamper global transition to low-carbon
energy and mobility systems (Tukker, 2014). On the contrary, some
other studies considered that there was a limited inﬂuence of China’s
rare earth policies on the international markets (Müller et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, almost all studies concluded that China’s rare earth ex-
port restrictions would lower the supply of rare earths to the rest of the
world. Therefore, there are emerging studies focusing on the sources of
rare earth both in China and other countries. For example, Wang et al.
(2015) and Ge et al. (2016) made a supply forecast of China’s rare earth
while some other papers focused on the supply outside China
(Christmann, 2014; Machacek and Fold, 2014; Golev et al., 2014).
As the Chinese policies have begun to impact the supply chain, more
and more researchers have turned the focus to the domestic policies of
China. For example, pollution tax (Wan and wen, 2015), resources tax
(Han et al., 2015), industry integration (Cui and Zhao, 2015; Han et al.,
2016; Rao, 2016) and industry upgrade (Mancheri and Marukawa,
Fig. 1. Various REE policies that China implemented since 2015. Reference: Hu, 2016.
Table 3
The development of the rare earth industry main target during the "13th Five-Year Plan".
Indicators Actual in 2015 Targets by 2020 Cumulative percentage change during
“13th ﬁve-year”
Economic Indicators
Average annual growth rate of industrial added value(%) 12.5 16.5 —
Industry proﬁt margins(%) 5.8 12 [6.2]
R & D expenditure of key enterprises accounted for the proportion of the main income(%) 3 5 [2]
2. Production Indicators
Smelting separation capacity (Million tons) 30 20 [-10]
Production of rare earth smelting and separation products (Million tons) 10 < 14 [< 4]
Recovery rate of mineral processing of light rare earth ore(%) 75 80 [5]
Comprehensive recovery rate of recovery of ion type rare earth ore(%) 75 85 [10]
Light rare earth smelting separation recovery rate(%) 90 92 [2]
Ion type rare earth smelting separation recovery rate(%) 94 96 [2]
The integration of the two standards of Enterprise Accounting(%) 30 90 [60]
3. Green Development Indicators
Reduction of major pollutants emission intensity in the whole industry (Containing sulfur
dioxide, ammonia nitrogen, waste water, etc., %)
— — [20]
Proportion of enterprise achieving energy consumption standard(%) 40 90 [50]
4. Application Industry Development Indicators
Market share of high-end rare earth functional materials and devices(%) 25 50 [25]
Proportion of primary raw materials for export products(%) 57 30 [-27]
Inside the brackets [] are cumulative numbers for ﬁve years. Source: MIIT, 2016, Rare Earth Industry Development Plan (2016–2020) (translated from Chinese).
N.A. Mancheri et al. Resources, Conservation & Recycling 142 (2019) 101–112
103
2016) are treated as good options for the Chinese government to im-
prove the development of rare earth industry.
The previous literature has looked at Chinese policy in the REE
arena, but none have been evaluated through the lens of the resilience
framework. In this work we use the resilience framework for critical
materials, as introduced in Sprecher et al. (2015). We assert this par-
ticular framework is particularly powerful because it evaluates all 4
primary mechanisms: diversity of supply, stock piling, recycling and
substitution. Examining the resilience of REE materials in China is be-
coming as critical as the rare earths themselves. With this evaluation we
hope to predict the survival (and resilience?) of the REE supply chain.
We extend this framework to include the Chinese REE policies as resi-
lience inﬂuencing (either positive or negative) mechanisms. The iden-
tiﬁed resilience inﬂuencing mechanisms are in no particular order:
quotas, taxes, international trade laws, China’s import of REEs, in-
vestment abroad, standardization, stockpiling, environmental regula-
tions, consolidation of the industry, and exchange and speculation
market.
2. Method and data
Application of resilience theory for the supply chains of raw mate-
rials oﬀers an eﬀective theoretical framework for studying how systems
responds to disruptions (short term disturbances) and constraints (long-
term disturbances). For the supply chains of raw materials, resilience is
deﬁned as ‘the capacity to supply enough of a given material to satisfy
the demands of society, and to provide suitable alternatives if in-
suﬃcient supply is available’. In Sprecher et al. (2017), the framework
is explained to ‘consist of four primary mechanisms that promote resi-
lience. On the supply side, 1) diversity of supply (e.g. primary pro-
duction in diﬀerent countries and recycling) is a crucial mechanism to
prevent disruptions, while 2) stockpiling of materials, which can buﬀer
against the impact of temporary supply disruptions. On the demand
side, the producers have the option of 3) improving the properties to
reduce material demand. Finally, 4) substitution can play a signiﬁcant
role in dampening the eﬀects of a supply disruption.
For example, in the case of neodymium-iron-boron- magnet (NdFeB)
supply chain, Fig. 2 shows each of these four mechanisms are connected
to speciﬁc actors in the REE supply chain. The mechanisms inﬂuence
each other primarily via the neodymium price feedback loop.
One notable feature of the resilience framework is that it is based on
a material ﬂow analysis (MFA) approach to supply chains. The frame-
work puts materials front and center and the discussion of threats to
security of supply and the solutions to those threats are also framed as
material solutions (e.g. The problem of reduced ore grades can be al-
leviated by increased recycling).
We extend this basic framework to include China’s rare earth po-
licies and analyze how the REE supply chain responds to various po-
licies. These policies are introduced in the framework as resilience in-
ﬂuencing mechanisms. Three main variables and a sub set of factors
under them are identiﬁed and analyzed through the lens of resilience
framework.
The identiﬁed factors are:
1) Restrictions on trade between China and RoW
a quotas b) taxes and c) international trade laws
2) Chinese inﬂuence on RoW supply chain
a China’s import of REEs b) investment abroad c) standardization
3) Dynamics inside the Chinese supply chain
a stockpiling, b) environmental regulations c) consolidation of the
industry d) exchange and speculation market.
This is a qualitative attempt to analyze the Chinese rare earth po-
licies and its impact on supply and should not be viewed through the
prism of quantitative methodologies used in literature to investigate the
material system dynamics and supply disruptions.
Insights in Chinese policy are based on literature research and in-
terviews with key actors. Data are collected from both primary and
secondary sources. The primary source involves interaction with sta-
keholders, subject experts and documents from government agencies.
Descriptive statistics in the analysis are based on the time-series export
and import data found in UNCOMTRADE data base. VENSIM software
was used to construct the system dynamics ﬁgures.
3. Results
In this work we focused speciﬁcally on the eﬀects that Chinese
policy has on the REE supply chain. Fig. 3 shows the system dynamics
of the supply chain as investigated. An essential feature of the REE
supply chain is the distinction between the Chinese supply chain and
the RoW supply chain. The two are connected via global trade ﬂows
and these ﬂows are inﬂuenced by policy.
Fig. 3 shows the dynamics of REE supply chain. Here we charted all
the supply disruptions, highlighted in red in Fig. 3. For each of the
disruptions we will ﬁrst describe what happened and then indicate how
this inﬂuences the overall system. Increased demand causes an increase
in price, while increased supply inﬂuences the price negatively. The
price acts as an overarching loop inﬂuenced by all factors identiﬁed by
Fig. 2. The conceptual model of the NdFeB supply chain (black) and the associated resilience mechanisms (green). The blue arrows indicate the direction of
inﬂuence: S= same, O= opposing. < ref Sprecher 2017. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article).
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red and green in Fig. 3. Pricing is highly obscure in REE sector and
prices are very often aﬀected by Chinese domestic policies as the
country controls more than 90 percent of global supply. For example,
the tightening supply policies of China caused the sharpest increase in
REE prices between 2009-11. The heavier rare earths (e.g., dysprosium,
terbium and europium) are more expensive, and historically prices have
risen steadily for these elements due to China’s rising domestic demand
and escalating export controls.
3.1. Restrictions on trade between China and RoW
3.1.1. Quotas
Several objectives motivate implementing quotas on raw material
production and export. Generally, the rationale behind imposing the
quota is to ensure supply to domestic downstream industries or as
means to inﬂuence the prices of speciﬁed commodities. In some cases,
imposing quota is justiﬁed as a response to market imperfections or on
the ground of protecting environment and resources.
The most restrictive measures that China imposed on REEs were
quotas on production, export and other restrictions on mining and se-
paration companies (Hatch, 2010). China’s Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM) used to allot quotas to companies. The export quota has
declined almost 50 percent from 2008, until it abolished in 2014. The
production quota has remained same from 2014 to 2017 and there is a
modest increase in 2018, which is set at 120,000 tons (Table 4). During
the quota regime, China didn’t distinguish between the individual rare
earth oxides, but divided the total tonnage of exports as light rare earth
and medium-and-heavy rare earth. This has led to Chinese companies
preferring to export as much as possible the high value heavy rare
earths like dysprosium, instead of low-value light rare earths like
cerium (communication with Chinese companies).
As depicted in Fig. 3, China’s restriction of production through
quotas is a supply chain constraint (long-term disturbances) rather than
an abrupt disruption, which inﬂuences domestic and international
prices positively (Brown and Eggert, 2017). However, a quota on export
volume directly disrupts the global supply, positively inﬂuences inter-
national price and demotes the resilience of the system. The positive
inﬂuence of China’s export curbs on international price prompts in-
vestment in non-Chinese primary production. For example, 2010-11
price spike had created opportunities to open mines or revive produc-
tion in US, Australia and Canada (Machacek and Fold, 2014). However,
none of these projects could emerge as an alternative to Chinese supply.
Chinese removal of export quota and export tariﬀ on rare earths, along
with a considerable amount of illegal material entering global market
had led to decline in long term average price of REEs since mid-2012.
The low prices are attractive for consumers but place an impossible
burden on new ROW projects to be ﬁnancially viable; thereby denying
customers the diversity of supply needed for a resilient system.
Fig. 3. Shows where the various types of policy inﬂuence the overall supply chain, and the direction of the inﬂuence. Compared to Fig. 2, this ﬁgure introduces blue
arrows with dots– indicating a signiﬁcant delay in the feedback – as red parameters, indicating the diﬀerent types of disruptions discussed here. Green represents
resilience promoting mechanisms as discussed widely in Sprecher et al., 2017 and Mancheri et al., 2018. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article).
Table 4
China’s production quota and export quota (in tons).
Source: Kingsnorth, 2016 and Asian Metal, 2018
Year Production quota Export quota
2010 89,200 30,258
2011 93,800 30,246
2012 93,800 30,996
2013 93,800 30,999
2014 105,000 30,610
2015 105,000 –
2016 105,000 –
2017 105,000 –
2018 120,000
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Eliminating existing quotas strengthen the global supply and promote
the REE resilience. This can have rebound eﬀects on decreasing black
market trade of rare earths.
3.1.2. Export taxes
Export taxes as high as 27 percent were applied to many of the rare
earths in China and 41 REE products have been listed as prohibited
trade goods. REE exporters, including foreign companies face stricter
supervision on their business activities. Starting in May 2015, the
Chinese government removed export taxes on REEs and introduced a
new resource tax based on value rather than on volume. The more
critical heavy rare earth concentrates are taxed at a blanket 27 percent
across all regions, and light rare earth concentrates are taxed at 11.5
percent in Inner Mongolia, 9.5 percent in Sichuan province, and 7.5
percent in Shandong province (Argus, 2015).
Fig. 4 shows an abrupt decline in the REE-FOB prices between De-
cember 2014-December 2015, particularly after the removal of export
tariﬀs in May 2015. There could be other factors that too contributed to
falling prices during this period. However, in the long term, the new ad
valorem tax introduced was expected to increase the price of REEs
particularly that of HREEs as the tax rate is applied diﬀerently to LREs
and HREs in concentrate form. The imposition of tax on production was
expected to inﬂuence the domestic as well as international price. Higher
taxes may reduce the oﬃcial Chinese supply. However, a higher tax and
consequent price increase will likely both induce illegal production in
China and increase demand for projects abroad, thus positively inﬂu-
encing diversity of supply and improving supply chain resilience in
long- term.
3.1.3. Countering trade restrictions: WTO lawsuits
Chinese supply restrictions of raw materials came to the forefront
when the US and the European Union (EU) (later joined by Mexico,
India, Brazil, Japan and Korea as third parties) lodged a complaint
against China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in June 2009,
claiming that export restrictions (including quotas and export taxes)
imposed by China violate WTO rules. March 2012 the US, the EU and
Japan again ﬁled a coordinated complaint against China to the WTO
over China’s export restrictions on rare earths and non-rare earth metals
such as tungsten and molybdenum. The countries challenged China’s
allocation and administration of export quotas, export licenses,
minimum export prices and non-publication of certain measures. They
further contended that the Chinese measures were aimed to satisfy
domestic demand and to control the international price of minerals
(Mancheri, 2015).
Although WTO rules aim to reduce protectionism on the import
side, the rules concerning export restrictions are ambiguous (Korinek
and Kim, 2010). China had argued that its export restriction policy is
reasonable under WTO law, more precisely the general exception clause
of Article 20 of the GATT, for reasons of natural resource conservation
and on environmental ground. In August 2014, ruling in favor of US,
the EU and Japan, the WTO asked China to remove export tariﬀs and
quotas. The reasoning was that China can’t justify export restrictions on
the ground of environment, since the country continue to extract the
resources for domestic use (WTO, 2014). In January 2015, in response
to unfavorable ruling, China abolished the quota system and instead
implemented a more stringent licensing system for exporters (Mancheri
and Marukawa, 2016).
Chinese supply restrictions had distorted REE prices and had major
disruptions in international REE supply chain. The WTO led counter
measures against China on its REE policies impacted prices negatively
and a consequent increase in Chinese export quantities in later years
eased the global supply chain. This shows that the WTO and interna-
tional rules helped to strengthen the supply, reduce prices both in China
and globally and strengthen the resilience. The WTO plays an important
role as an arbitrator in maintaining a resilient supply chain system,
albeit with a signiﬁcant time-lag.
3.2. Chinese inﬂuence on RoW supply chain
3.2.1. International standards
Accepting a proposal from China, the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) has formed a technical committee (ISO/TC 298)
in September 2015 to explore the possibility of international standar-
dization of rare earth products. The Standardization Administration of
China (SAC) has been appointed as the secretariat. Currently, national
standard bureaus of nine countries such as Australia (SA), Brazil
(ABNT), Canada (SCC), India (BIS), Japan (JISC), Korea (KATS),
Russian Federation (GOSTR), United States (ANSI) are participating
members of the TC and there are twenty-two observing members (ISO,
2017).
The initial scope is deﬁned as “standardization in the ﬁeld of rare
earth ores, concentrates, metals, alloys, compounds, materials including
the reuse and recycling of waste rare earth products”. China led tech-
nical committee considers unregulated and /or illegal production of
REEs as a core issue. The committee expects the introduction of stan-
dards should aid in ensuring all rare earths entering the supply chain
are sourced from legal miners, who abide by best environmental
practices.
Through the globally accepted standardization, China intends to
shut down the illegal ﬂow of rare earths (Investor Intel, 2015; Packey
and Kingsnorth, 2016). Once the countries agree on standards, the onus
will be on purchasing companies to buy the standardized rare earths
products from legal suppliers. Standardization will therefore most
probably result in tighter Chinese government control on REE
Fig. 4. Chinese rare earth oxide prices December 2014- December 2015- (FOB), Source: Argus metal page, 2016.
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resources.
Standardization could also provide China more power in deciding
the price while not guaranteeing a reduced price diﬀerence between
domestic and international customers. Standardization will also cause
additional transaction costs and complexity to REE trade, consequently
inﬂuencing the price positively. From resilience perspective, the im-
plementation of standards could cause a slow disruption (see Table 1) in
global supply chain. If such a policy causes excessive administrative
costs and restrictions on trade, standardization will weaken the resi-
lience and may lead (ironically) to an increase in illegal mining and
exports.
3.2.2. Chinese imports of REEs
Although China is the largest producer of REEs, its import of rare
earth compounds has steadily increased since started in 2013. The
country imported 3668 tons of REEs in 2013, which increased to
34,339 tons in 2017. Some of these minerals have been imported from
the Molycorp plant in California for further puriﬁcation in China.
Molycorp used to exports its neodymium-praseodymium (Nd-Pr) oxide
mixes to China for separation and producing metals. (Interview with
Molycorp staﬀ). A major portion of Lynas’ output is also being exported
to China (Lynas, 2017) (Fig. 5).
China’s import marks a reverse transformation in global REE supply
chain in the upstream sector. China’s import of REE concentrates is
expected to increase further due to new policies (see Table 3) targeting
industrial upgradation of domestic mineral sector from a mere producer
and exporter of REE composites to more sophisticated metals and
products. As the domestic mining get restricted increasingly on the
grounds of environment or legality, Chinese smelters would be com-
pelled to import the concentrates to fully utilize their processing ca-
pacity and to fulﬁll the demand from downstream industry.
An increase in Chinese imports will reduce the availability of ma-
terial to non-Chinese companies, consequently reducing the resilience
of the global REE supply chain. Interestingly, an increase in Chinese
imports would aﬀect the domestic price negatively and international
price of REEs positively. The impact would be less disruptive since there
are very few smelters and intermediate producers outside China,
especially who produce REE oxides and metals. However, European and
Japanese companies, including their subsidiaries in Southeast Asia, may
face supply risk in case of an unexpected demand surge in China.
3.2.3. Chinese investments in REE projects abroad
Chinese companies have started to invest in rare earth projects
outside China. The examples include, the purchase of Molycorp by a
consortium comprised of Shanghai-based Shenghe Resources in June
2017 (Roskill, 2017). Shenghe is also a majority shareholder of Aus-
tralia listed Greenland minerals, which owns the Kvanefjeld REE project
in Greenland (Greenland Minerals, 2017). Another example is Huatai
mining, which is a major stakeholder in Northern Minerals’ Browns
Range project in Western Australia. Huatai is a subsidiary of Shandong
Taizhong Energy, one of the largest coal companies in China (Northern
minerals, 2016a).
The mine, beneﬁciation and hydrometallurgical processing plant at
Browns Range is also being built by a Chinese company, Sinosteel
MECC, a subsidiary of Sinosteel, a state owned enterprise (SOE) in
China (Northern minerals, 2016b). Northern minerals has signed an
oﬀtake agreement with a subsidiary of the Guandong Rare Earths
Group, one of the six state owned REE conglomerates.
Acquiring foreign REE assets is a long-term strategy for addressing
China’s security of supply. This also serves to protect Chinese industry
from domestic resource depletion, declining ore grades and increasing
cost of domestic mining under strict environmental regulations. There
are also eﬀorts by the big six REE SOEs to shut down unproﬁtable and
environmentally polluting mining operations, which serves as a moti-
vation to invest in foreign countries.
Chinese investment in foreign REE mines can impact the supply
chain in two ways: 1) the company processes the concentrate in the host
country and cater to the global demand 2) or the company can import
the concentrate to China to cater to the demand from domestic smel-
ters. China’s domestic demand account for more than 80 percent of
total global consumption. This is attributed to the ever-increasing do-
mestic production REE contained ﬁnal products such as wind turbines,
electric vehicles and electronic commodities (Kingsnorth, 2016).
From a resilience perspective, one could assume that China’s in-
volvement in developing REE projects abroad is a resilience promoting
mechanism as this helps diversiﬁcation of supply, a core component of
a resilient system. Especially, the investors in western countries are
reluctant to invest when the prices are low and Chinese investments
should be seen as a positive step during such situations.
3.3. Dynamics inside the Chinese supply chain
3.3.1. Illegal mining, environmental regulations and consolidation
The current state of the global REE market characterized by over-
supply from China and a low price owes much to the signiﬁcant volume
of illegal materials being produced each year in China, particularly in
the southern provinces. The exact volume of illegal mining and export
is diﬃcult to trace and vary in estimates by diﬀerent agencies and
scholars. One way to trace the illegal trade is by estimating the quantity
diﬀerences in export and import statistics (Fig. 6). Mancheri and
Marukawa (2016) has explored extensively the diﬀerences in REE ex-
port of China and import of its partners. The most recent and frequently
quoted estimates are around 40,000 tons (Packey and Kingsnorth,
2016). According to Kingsnorth, 40–50% of rare earth production in
China is grey/illegal and the Chinese REE magnet industry’s demand for
neodymium/praseodymium exceeds the production quota signiﬁcantly,
Fig. 5. Chinese import of REE compounds and concentrates, Source:
UNComtrade data base 2018.
Fig. 6. China’s Exports of Rare earth Elements. Yellow bar in the ﬁgure shows
the import statistics of the same product of China’s trade partners. Source:
Author’s calculations using UNCOMTRADE database, 2016 (For interpretation
of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article).
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eﬀectively condoning illegal mining and processing (Kingsnorth, 2016).
Fig. 6 shows that since 2008, exports from China have been de-
clining gradually along with an increase in the average price, which
peaked at USD 158.21 per kg in 2011, due to an immediate halt of
China’s REE export to Japan. Prices have steadily decreased since then,
almost reaching to 2009 levels. Fig. 6 also shows (yellow bar in the
ﬁgure) that the export constraints put in place by China gave rise to
signiﬁcant illegal mining and exports that eventually contributed up to
40 percent of total world production, which is captured from the trade
statistics of China’s trade partners. The ﬁgure also reveals the correla-
tion between Chinese export restrictions and illegal trade. Introduction
of trade restricting measures clearly lead to an increasing quantity of
illegal trade. For example, in 2011, China’s reported export of REEs
were equal to 16,860 tons while trade partners reported a total import
of 37,615 tons from China. Due to the unfavorable WTO ruling and
market reasons since 2013, China has relaxed the export restrictions
and the ﬁgure shows less diﬀerences between export and import
quantity in following years.
The campaign to clamp down on illegal production in China is likely
to be a gradual process but it will provide oﬃcials more control to
restrict supply. The price will go up for both domestic and foreign in-
dustries in the downstream sector if the government takes strict mea-
sures against the illegal mining without addressing the consequent
supply constraints. Contrary to popular belief, illegal mining and
smuggling help to increase the resilience of the REEs supply chain as it
allows an alternative method of obtaining raw materials when oﬃcial
production is constrained. This was evident during the 2010 REE crisis
(Sprecher et al., 2015).
The BBC reported in 2015, “it could be argued that China’s dom-
inance of the rare earth market is less about geology and far more about
the country’s willingness to take an environmental hit that other na-
tions shy away from” (Maughan, 2015). Countries like China which
exercise lower levels of environmental and legislative control, can
produce more readily and at a lower cost in the absence of any gov-
ernment-speciﬁc controls. In the pursuit of industrial catch up, China
accepted signiﬁcant environmental degradation caused by the REE in-
dustry. For example, to produce one ton of rare earth oxide from ionic-
adsorbed clays, 2000 tons of tailings and 1000 tons of wastewater
containing heavy metals are generated (Packey and Kingsnorth, 2016).
Reﬁning one ton of RE oxide can potentially produce 1.4 tons of
radioactive waste (Jiabao and Jie, 2009). The sulfur emissions for 1 ton
of REE ore is 9600 to 12,000 cubic meters, containing a mixture of
hydroﬂuoric acid, sulfur dioxide, and sulfuric acid (Hurst, 2010). The
environmental problems get worse as only 87 rare earth enterprises are
recognized as environmental law abiding and the rest are operating
illegally or don’t adhere to environmental regulations (Chen, 2015).
China has enacted new laws to deal with environmental problems
related to REEs. For instance, ammonium nitrate in waste water is now
limited to 25mg per liter instead of previous limits reported between
300–5000mg per liter (Gunn, 2014). Reducing the ammonium nitrate
content in the waters surrounding the mining facilities in China will be
quite diﬃcult if according to life cycle inventory data from REE mines
in China (Lee and Wen, 2016).
A rigorous environment protection law has been passed in January
2015, with severe penalties including cancellation of licenses in viola-
tion of the rules. China is also stepping up eﬀorts to restrict illegal
mining and export of rare earths by setting up a system of certiﬁcation
to trace the origin of material. The government is enforcing measures
such as pollution discharge standards, which set limits for CO2 emis-
sions, radioactive waste and particulates that emerge in REE mines and
related industries (MIIT, 2016). For example, the Ministry of Environ-
mental Protection in China limits sulfur emissions to 50 ppm for the
diesel industry (Dieselnet, 2015).
The liberal environment policy enabled China to supply REE mi-
nerals in the international market with low prices forcing others to
close down (Fernandez, 2017). No doubt that the REE production in
China will become more expensive due to strict environmental reg-
ulations. The cost for producers to implement some of the environ-
mental protection eﬀorts would be $161 million with an additional
annual environmental protection costs of about $41 million to an an-
nual production of 150 tons of rare earth elements in China (Hurst,
2010). The administrative burden, in addition to the expense of in-
corporating more advanced technology and infrastructure may increase
the price of REEs. There are also doubts the state will not enforce be-
cause many of these REE processing facilities are state-owned. The of-
ﬁcial production will be aﬀected negatively if China implements strict
environmental regulations including penalties for violations. Reduced
supply may lead to increase in prices of all REOs prompting others to
start businesses or increase output in projects like Mount Weld, thus by
aﬀecting the resilience positively.
In order tackle the illegal production and pollution, China took a
diﬀerent route by consolidating all rare earth enterprises into six big
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The consolidation process intensiﬁed in
2014 particularly after China’s debacle in WTO. The process allowed six
large SOEs led by China Minmetals, Chinalco, Baotou Steel, Xiamen
Tungsten, Ganzhou Rare Earths and Guangdong Guangsheng Rare
Earths to bring all rare earth mining and separation companies under
their control. The government supported them with legislation and ﬁ-
nancing, and these large ﬁrms are permitted to merge and acquire small
operations and illegal mines. As a policy support, over 90 per cent of
production quotas are now allocated to these groups (Fig. 7). As of June
2016 these six groups have integrated 22 out of 23 mines, and 54 of 59
smelting separation plants (Hu, 2016).
Consolidation of the industry along with curtailing of illegal mining
would enable China to eﬀectively control the supply, prices and keep
the annual production of rare earths within 140 thousand tons by 2020,
a stated objective of Chinese government (MIIT, 2016). China achieved
its objective of controlling the entire REE supply chain from mining to
end products through the consolidation and government’s hold on the
REE industry has become stronger. Consolidation is seen as a resilience
demoting mechanism as it centralizes the production and limits the
consumer choices. Consolidation and the supply side actions taken by
China have led to a steady increase in the price of rare earths in later
part of 2017. A sustained increase in prices would prompts further
development of new mines outside China, however, the monopoly po-
sition of Chinese companies gives them the power to manipulate pri-
cing, which dissuades investments in non-Chinese primary production.
3.3.2. State sponsored stockpiling
Stockpiling of REEs in China has gained momentum since 2012.
Under the direction of the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), at
least 10 storage facilities are being built and managed by the world’s
largest producer of rare-earth metals; government-controlled Baotou
Steel Rare-Earth Group. The Chinese State Reserve Bureau (SRB) began
a rare earth stockpiling program and in late-2014 and the government
had built storage for more than 40 thousand tons of REOs. The SRB may
purchase up to 100 thousand tons, primarily focusing on medium to
heavy rare earths (Brown and Eggert, 2017).
Fig. 7. RE oxide plants market share of six SOEs in major provinces. Source: Hu,
2016.
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China also started stockpiling of REEs as a commercial reserve in
March 2016. The ﬁrst commercial reserve after the completion of
consolidation and the reserves are collected from the six group’s
warehouses. The mining companies also stockpile certain grades of ore
for future processing.
Zhang and Kleit, 2016 established a theoretical model to drive the
value of such stockpile by mining companies and found that kpiling
option can signiﬁcantly boost a mine's proﬁt.
In the ﬁrst commercial reserve, neodymium and praseodymium are
stockpiled as a mixture as well as individual oxides, which constitute
the largest share of about 2590 tons (Table 5). Stockpiled heavy REEs
are dysprosium (830 tons), terbium (260 tons), yttrium (700 tons), er-
bium (500 tons), europium (270 tons) and lutetium (50 tons). Stock-
piling can have tremendous impact on the REE market as the volume of
stockpiled material as a fraction of yearly production is very high. For
example, the annual global production of lutetium is 10 tons, terbium
650 tons and erbium 900 tons, which are mostly produced in China
(Kingsnorth, 2016). China’s continuation of stockpiling, especially the
more critical heavy rare earths (HREE) can severely impact the prices
(Fig. 8). Consequently, China is in a strong position to manipulate
supply and hence rare earth prices by increasing or releasing its stra-
tegic reserves.
As illustrated in Fig. 8, building up a signiﬁcant stockpile can cause
a surge in demand and hence increase prices. Release of an existing
stockpile creates supply and consequently inﬂuences price negatively
(Mancheri et al., 2018 and Sprecher et al., 2017). Stockpiling is in-
herently a disruptive mechanism and has shown demoting eﬀects on
supply chain resilience in the following way. Urgent stockpiling during
a supply crisis can drive up the price signiﬁcantly, fueling the perceived
threat of supply disruption (Sprecher et al., 2015). The perceived
supply threat consequently leads to emergency stockpiling by manu-
facturers and speculators further pushing the price up. Brown and
Eggert (2017) showed that stockpiling increases the price of the
stockpiled REO and increases legal Chinese ore production. A sig-
niﬁcant complication is that an increase in production of all REOs may
lead to the balance problem in REEs (Binnemans et al., 2013) and a
decrease in prices of non-stockpiled REOs.
3.3.3. Exchange markets and speculation
In 2011, China had set up the Fanya Metal Exchange for trading
technology metals in Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province. This
exchange had a powerful impact on the minor metals and had been
widely successful in attracting investors between 2011 and 2015. In just
three years of its operation, starting with Indium trading, it has amassed
around four times the amount of indium the world consumes a year.
Fanya turned China, the world's largest supplier of indium, from a net
indium exporter into an importer. Subsequently the exchange added
around 14 minor metals to its trading portfolio like, ammonium para-
tungstate (APT), germanium, bismuth, antimony and gallium, cobalt,
rhodium, vanadium pentoxide, silver, dysprosium oxide and terbium
oxide (Abraham 2015).
The exchange reportedly held 19,228 tons of bismuth, more than
twice as much as total annual global consumption in 2012, 3629 tons of
indium, equaling around ten years of China’s domestic production and
gallium stocks of around 197 tons (Metal Bulletin, 2017). The exact
quantity of REEs in the inventory is unknown. In 2015 the exchange
bankrupted due to corruption and ﬁnancial irregularities.
The Fanya Metal Exchange highlights how stockpiling of metals by
investors or speculators waiting for higher prices has the potential to
disrupt supply – similar to the mechanism behind state-sponsored
stockpiling. But uncertainty about the release of vast inventories from
the collapsed exchange continues to weigh heavily on China’s minor
metals market. The Chinese government intervention on the bank-
rupted exchange market and consequent release of existing metals
stocks to the market was expected to ease the supply and suppress the
prices. The price may go up marginally if the inventory is added to the
existing commercial stocks.
4. Discussion and implications
Rare earths are considered as strategic resources because of the
business, technological applications and governments' direct policy
interventions in the sector. This study, on scrutinizing these policy in-
terventions and its impact on business contribute to the wider under-
standing of the sector. Resilience is a useful framework to follow the
consequences of policy through the system. By adopting a resilience
framework, we can see how policies works like ecological theory—-
when one part of the system is disrupted then it has a trickle-down
eﬀect.
This study highlighted how the policies aﬀect supply chain diﬀer-
ently in China and in the rest of the world. We analyzed various policies
such as: restrictions on trade between China and RoW, Chinese inﬂu-
ence on RoW supply chain, and the dynamics inside the Chinese supply
chain. We focused on how price responds to various resilience inﬂu-
encing mechanisms such as diversity of supply, legal and regulatory
Table 5
Chinese state and commercial stockpile of REEs in tons (2012–2016).
Source: Hu, 2016
Year Subject Total Light REEs % Heavy REEs %
2012 State 19750 16500 83.54 3250 16.46
2014 State 10900 5000 45.87 5090 46.70
2016 Commercial 5400 2590 47.96 2810 52.04
Fig. 8. Impact of stockpiling on neodymium/praseodymium oxide price in 2015-16.
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frameworks and, stockpiling. Ultimately, we show that supply chain is a
complex phenomenon and resilience of a system is not solely dependent
on physical disruptions but also on dynamic factors such as societal and
geo-political.
Based on our analysis we determine that the international policies
generally tend to serve supply chain resilience better than national
policies. In terms of the restrictions on trade between China and RoW,
Table 6 shows that through the various policies made on the national
levels, resilience is weakened, but strengthened by policies made on the
global level. Regarding the Chinese inﬂuence on RoW supply chain, the
policies such as: international standards and Chinese import of REEs–
serve to weaken resilience whereas Chinese investments abroad serve to
increase it. Finally, the dynamics inside the Chinese supply chain serve
ultimately to demote supply chain resilience. This type of analysis
though is based on dynamic, ever changing factors so needs to be up-
dated every few years.
The Table 6 summarizes the results analyzed in previous sections.
The table is not based on any quantitative assessment and doesn’t
Table 6
Eﬀect of policies on REE supply resilience.
??????????????????????????????????????????
Policy Global supply 
??????a?o?al 
price Chinese price Resilience 
? posi?on o? ?uo?as Weaken 
Increase 
?posi??e 
e?ec?? 
Increase 
?posi??e e?ec?? Demote/weaken
Taxes Weaken 
Increase 
?posi??e 
e?ect? 
Increase 
?posi??e e?ect? Demote/weaken
WT? an? interna?onal 
re?ula?ons Increase 
Decrease 
?ne?a??e 
e?ect? 
Decrease 
?ne?a??e e?ect? Impro?e/stren?then 
????????????????????????????????????
Policy Global supply 
Interna?onal 
price Chinese price Resilience 
Interna?onal 
standards Weaken 
Increase 
?posi??e 
e?ect?
Increase 
?posi??e e?ect? Demote/weaken
Chinese import o? R??s Weaken 
Increase 
?posi??e 
e?ect?
Decrease 
?ne?a??e e?ect? Demote/weaken
Chinese in?estments in 
R?? pro?ects abroad Increase 
Decrease 
?ne?a??e 
e?ect? 
Decrease 
?ne?a??e e?ect? Impro?e/strengthen
????????????????????????????????????????
Policy Global supply 
Interna?onal 
price Chinese price Resilience 
Illegal mining and 
export Increase 
Decrease 
?nega??e 
e?ect?
Decrease 
?nega??e e?ect? Impro?e/strengthen
Chinese en?ironmental 
regula?ons Weaken
Increase 
?posi??e 
e?ect?
Increase 
?posi??e e?ect? Demote/weaken
Consolida?on o? rare 
earth enterprises Weaken
Increase 
?posi??e 
e?ect?
Increase 
?posi??e e?ect? Demote/weaken
State sponsored 
stockpiling Weaken
Increase 
?posi??e 
e?ect?
Increase 
?posi??e e?ect? Demote/weaken
?xchange markets and 
specula?on Weaken
Increase 
?posi??e 
e?ect?
Increase 
?posi??e e?ect? Demote/weaken
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demonstrate the resilience model quantitatively. The rankings in the
table are without a scale as it is very diﬃcult to quantify the policies
and their impact.
The Chinese production quota, the region-based tax system, stock-
piling strategies and consolidation of the industry will probably con-
tinue to tighten the supply of rare earths keeping the prices high for
particularly the heavy elements. REE prices are largely dependent and
volatile on Chinese actions as we explored in this paper. Price un-
certainty is considered as a characteristics of a less resilient market.
Price uncertainty makes investors vulnerable to short term risks, pre-
vents new investment and diversiﬁcation of supply.
Consolidation of the industry, restricting the export of primary raw
materials and policies to increase market share of high-end rare earth
products suggest that China intents industrial upgradation and divert
more supply for domestic use. However, the liberal REE policies of the
early years of China’s industrialization, which led to overcapacity, blind
competition and signiﬁcant environmental damages may not work
again in achieving such targets. The new policies like strict environ-
mental standards, closing of illegal mines and comparatively high cost
concentrate imported from abroad reduce Chinese advantages of low
cost production and low price REEs for domestic downstream industry.
The new environmental standards will certainly aﬀect capex and opex
of the Chinese downstream industry in the long-term.
A limitation of this study is that it is often diﬃcult to quantify the
public policy issues and its impacts, particularly due to the lack of data.
For future research, a detailed quantitative analysis of Chinese REE
policies and its impact on supply chain can provide knowledge about
the dynamics of global REE ﬂows. It will also help to fully quantify the
resilient supply chain framework parameters. Our ﬁndings doesn’t
imply that the price ﬂuctuations are only due to changes in Chinese
policies. However, price volatility is also related to prevailing global
market conditions, aﬀecting the entire mineral sector. In this context, it
would be very interesting to see future research applying this frame-
work to the supply chains of major metals like steel, aluminum or
copper.
Since this study is based on an inductive reasoning, by its nature, is
more exploratory of each identiﬁed factors, we believe this study will
enable other researchers to build on the resilience approach and ana-
lyze more thoroughly the bottlenecks and disruptions in a supply chain
of critical materials.
By applying our framework, one can explain that a supply chain has
no ﬁxed amount of resilience, so the question is, how it become more
resilient? We resolve that resilience is like a muscle, it can be built-up.
Policies are never perfect, and they don’t always go according plan, and
sometimes even have opposite eﬀects. This study is to designed to help
the RE industry, policy makers, and stakeholders make some sense out
of it.
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